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ABSTRACT
We study the problem of privately emulating shared mem-
ory in message passing networks. The system includes N
servers, and at most e semi-Byzantine servers that can de-
viate from the algorithm by sending corrupted data. More-
over, at most f servers can fail and stop.
The focus is on coded atomic storage (CAS) algorithms.
We present a variant that ensures no information leakage by
letting the servers store their data as secret shares. Our en-
hancement to CAS uses d(N + k+ 2e)/2e-size quorums and
Reed-Solomon codes. This enhancement preserves the algo-
rithm ability to function in asynchronous system settings.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to ad-
dress the privacy issue when emulating shared memory in
message-passing systems.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.2 [Operating Systems]: Storage Management—Dis-
tributed memories; C.4 [Performance Of Systems]: Fault
tolerance; C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]:
Distributed Systems—Distributed applications
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1. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy are often imperative for distributed
systems. This motivates us to study the problem of em-
ulating shared memory in message passing networks that
include N servers, at most f crash-stop failures and e semi-
Byzantine servers that can deviate from the algorithm by
sending corrupted data. We look at coded atomic storage
algorithms that ensure no information leakage by letting the
servers store their data as secret shares. We consider an en-
hancement of the coded atomic storage (CAS) algorithm by
Cadambe et al. [3] in which we use d(N+k+2e)/2e-size quo-
rums and (N, k)-Reed-Solomon codes, where k represents
the message length.
The first algorithm for emulating a single-writer multi-
reader shared memory by Attiya et al. [1], as well as the
multi-writer multi-reader version by Fan and Lynch [4], han-
dle link and node failures. Cadambe et al. [3] present the
coded atomic storage (CAS) algorithm and improve com-
munication and storage costs by using quorums and (N, k)-
maximum distance separable (MDS) codes [7]. The CAS
algorithm enables the reader to restore the data under the
presence of N−k
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stop-failed servers. We address privacy by
storing on each node merely parts of the data, as in Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme [8], which we can implement using
Reed-Solomon codes [5] and a matching error correction al-
gorithm (Berlekamp-Welch [9]). This variation of the CAS
algorithm also provides resilience against other errors, for
example, data corruption of a bounded number of secret
shares. We show how to combine shared-memory emulation
with robustness and privacy.
Background
The (N, k)-threshold scheme for integers k and N , such that
0 < k ≤ N , is defined by Shamir [8] and splits a secret s
into N secret shares {si}i∈{1,...,N}. This scheme requires
that there exists a mapping from any S ⊆ {si}i∈{1,...,N}
with |S| ≥ k to the secret s, but it is impossible to deter-
mine s from a set of less than k secret shares. Let K
be a finite field such that it size |K| is prime. The (N, k)-
Reed-Solomon code, Φ : S → W, transforms the input data,
i.e., one element of a k dimensional vector space, S, over
K, into N dimensional vector space,W, over the same field,
K. k and N are as above. We call N the block length
and k the message length. The Berlekamp-Welch algorithm,
Φ−1, can correct (N, k)-Reed-Solomon codes within O(N3)
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Algorithm 1: The robust and private coded atomic storage algorithm, code for pi.
1 Writer: // Writes secret s.
2 Query for the highest finalized tag from a quorum, select the message ((z, k), w, ‘fin’) such that z is max.;
3 pre-write: Send ((z + 1, i),Φpj (s), ‘pre’) to all pj ∈ P and wait until quorum acknowledges;
4 finalize: Send ((z + 1, i),⊥, ‘fin’) to all pj ∈ P and wait until quorum acknowledges;
5 Reader: // Returns secret s, or ⊥ in case of failure.
6 Query for the highest finalized tag from a quorum, select the tag ((z, j), wpj , ‘fin’) such that z is maximal;
7 Finalize: Send (t,⊥, ‘fin’) to all s ∈ P and let Q be the response of a quorum ;
8 if |{(t, w, ‘fin’) ∈ Q : w 6= ⊥}| ≥ k + 2e then
9 return Φ−1({(t, w, s) ∈ Q : w 6= ⊥});
10 else return ⊥ ;
11 Server: Storage variable: S ⊂ T × (W ∪ {⊥})× {‘pre’, ‘fin’};
12 upon (receive query) do
13 Reply with highest finalized tag;
14 upon (receive pre-write (t, w, ‘pre’)) do
15 if @(t, •) ∈ S then S ← S ∪ (t, w, ‘pre’);
16 Reply with acknowledgement;
17 upon (receive finalize (t,⊥, ‘fin’) from writer) do
18 if ∃(t, w, ‘pre’) ∈ S then
19 S ← (S \ {(t, w, ‘pre’)}) ∪ (t, w, ‘fin’);
20 else Add (t,⊥, ‘fin’) to S;
21 Reply with acknowledgement;
22 upon (finalize (t,⊥, ‘fin’) from reader) do
23 if ∃(t, w, •) ∈ S : w 6= ⊥ then
24 S ← (S \ {(t, w, •)}) ∪ {(t, w, ‘fin’)};
25 reply (t, w, ‘fin’);
26 else
27 S ← S ∪ {(t,⊥, ‘fin’)};
28 reply (t,⊥, ‘fin’);
time in the presence of e errors and f erasures, as long as
2e + f < N − k + 1 [9]. Note that (N, k)-Reed-Solomon
codes are a (N, k)-threshold scheme [5]. For this the input
vector (σ1, . . . , σk) ∈ S consists of the secret σ1 and ran-
domly chosen values σ2, . . . , σk from a uniform distribution
over S. We use Φ to map (σ1, . . . , σk) to the secret shares
(w1, . . . , wN ) ∈ W.
Our contribution
We show how to emulate atomic shared memory in the pres-
ence of semi-Byzantine servers. This approach ensures pri-
vacy. Namely, no group of up to k − 1 servers is able to
reconstruct the stored data, i.e., the secret. Furthermore,
a reader can reconstruct the correct secret even if up to
e servers deliver corrupted secret shares. We do that using
Reed-Solomon codes [6] and the Berlekamp-Welch error cor-
rection algorithm [9]. This works because Cadambe et al. [3]
use the class of maximum-distance separable codes for their
CAS algorithm, which includes the Reed-Solomon codes.
2. SYSTEM SETTINGS
We consider message passing networks in which nodes ex-
change messages via communication links. Messages are of
the form (t, w, d) ∈ T ×W∪{⊥}×D, where T is the set of tag
tuples (z, i) that contain an integer z and a node identifier i.
With W we denote, as mentioned, the set of secret shares,
where ⊥ is the invalid share and D := {‘pre’, ‘fin’} is the
label set. We distinguish among three node types: server,
reader and writer. Each writer and each reader is reliably
connected to all servers, and with bounded communication
delays. Let P be the server set, where N := |P|.
Our settings are motivated by (reliable) servers that stores
large secret shares on (unreliable) mass storage systems. We
allow at most e semi-Byzantine servers and at most f fail-
ures, such as communication delay violation. We assume
that semi-Byzantine servers can send corrupted secret shares
to readers, but not corrupted tags or labels, i.e., when a
semi-Byzantine server replies with a tuple (t, w, d), only w
might be corrupted. Writers split secrets using the (N, k)-
Reed-Solomon code and submit the resulting secret shares
to the servers. Servers store their secret shares and deliver
them to the readers upon request. The proposed solution
withstands a fault model that includes both server stop-
failure and server semi-Byzantine behavior.
We say that a secret sharing protocol is t-private when a
set of at most t servers cannot compute the secret, as in [2].
Note that a 0-private protocol preserves no privacy. When
the presence of at most t semi-Byzantine servers and at most
s stop-failed servers does not influence the correctness of
secret restored by a reader, we say that the protocol is (s, t)-
robust, similar to t-resilience in [2].
Quorums of (k + 2e)-overlap
We define a quorum as a server subset Q ⊆ P with at least
dN+k+2e
2
e elements, and we write Q as the all quorum set.
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Lemma 1 shows that any two different quorums share at
least k+2e servers, rather than just k of them as in Cadambe
et al. [3]. These quorums guarantees that once a writer
finishes its write operation, any reader can retrieve at least
k + 2e secret shares and reconstruct the secret.
Lemma 1. (Variation of [3], Lemma 5.1) Suppose that
1 ≤ k ≤ N − 2f − 2e. (1) If Q1, Q2 ∈ Q, then |Q1 ∩Q2| ≥
k + 2e. (2) The existence of such a k implies the existence
of Q ∈ Q such that Q has no crashed servers.
Proof. (1) Let Q1, Q2 ∈ Q, then |Q1 ∩Q2| = |Q1|+ |Q2| −
|Q1 ∪ Q2| ≥ 2
⌈
N+k+2e
2
⌉ −N ≥ k + 2e. (2) Since there are
at most f crashed servers, we can show that without such f
servers, there are still enough alive servers for a quorum. It
follows that N − f ≥ N − ⌊N−k−2e
2
⌋
=
⌈
N+k+2e
2
⌉
.
By Lemma 1, the atomicity and liveness analysis in [3, The-
orem 5.2 to Lemma 5.9] also holds when the CAS algorithm
that uses (k + 2e)-overlap quorums.
3. THE ALGORITHM
In order to tolerate at most e (secret share corruptions
made by) semi-Byzantine servers, we propose Algorithm 1
as a variation of Cadambe et al. [3] CAS algorithm that uses
(k+2e)-overlap quorums and (N, k)-Reed-Solomon codes [6],
which is an (N, k)-MDS [7] code that Cadambe et al. [3]
uses. By the atomicity and liveness analysis for the case of
(k + 2e)-overlap quorums (the remark after Lemma 1), the
reader retrieves k + 2e unique secret shares that include at
most e manipulated shares.
Corollary 1. For 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 2f − 2e, Algorithm 1
emulates a shared atomic read/write memory.
Robustness
Robustness is added by the ability of the Berlekamp-Welch
algorithm to correct error in the Reed-Solomon codes. Note
that semi-Byzantine servers only introduce corrupted se-
cret shares. Lemma 2 shows the robustness of Algorithm 1
against up to e semi-Byzantine servers and up to f stop-
failed servers.
Lemma 2. For k ∈ {1 . . . , N − 2f − 2e}, Algorithm 1
(f, e)-robust.
Proof. If a writer issues a query, pre-write and finalize oper-
ations it does not read back the secret from the server. Thus,
writers are immune to semi-Byzantine servers. Servers do
not exchange secrets with other servers and thus are not di-
rectly affected by semi-Byzantine servers. A reader collects
secret shares from qourum of servers, but never writes them
to servers, since a query and a finalize only contains a ⊥ in
place of a secret share. By Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 follows
that a reader pi receives at least k+2e secret shares from the
finalize operation. From these k + 2e secret shares at most
e are corrupted and, thus, pi computes the correct secret by
applying Berlekamp-Welch.
Privacy
Our approach ensures privacy of the secret among servers.
In Lemma 3 we see that a group of less than k servers are
not able to reconstruct the secret by combining the secret
shares they have stored locally.
Lemma 3. For 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 2f − 2e, Algorithm 1 is
(k − 1)-private.
Proof. Reed-Solomon codes implement the Shamir secret
sharing [5] and, thus, k−1 servers cannot compute the secret
using their k − 1 local secret shares.
Note that in the case k = 1, even if privacy is not protected,
it is still possible to correct corrupted memory copies. This
holds because the reader reads 1+2e secret shares and, thus,
the additional 2e secret shares contain redundant informa-
tion for the Berlekamp-Welch error correction.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Interestingly, fundamental building blocks for distributed
systems can provide privacy and robustness. We show how
to implement a robust and private coded atomic storage
protocol, which is resilient to semi-Byzantine servers using
shared memory emulation in message passing networks. In
addition, our algorithm tolerates server crashes, and at the
same time, it ensures the privacy of the stored data. We
believe that our approach and techniques are useful for pro-
viding robustness and privacy for many more building blocks
for distributed systems.
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